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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN AGGREGATE
I
C O R P O R A T I O N , a corporation,
1
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY, a
corporation, and P A U L B U E H N E R , Case No.
13478
Defendants and Respondents,
vs.
D. W. BRIMHALL,
Additional Defendant on
Counterclaim, and Cross-Complainant.

Petition of Plaintiff-Appellant for
Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof

Plaintiff-Appellant American Aggregate Corporation comes now by its legal counsel Paul E . Reimann,
and pursuant to Rule 76 (e) and (f) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above entitled cause,
for an order vacating the decision which affirms those
portions of the judgment appealed from, and for consideration of all of the issues raised on appeal, none of
1
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which issues is mentioned in the opinion. I n support
of this motion, counsel for appelant respectfully points
out that only portions of the undisputed material facts
are stated in the opinion. Also, there are quotations of
testimony of adverse witnesses on direct examination
as factual premises on which the conclusions for affirmance were predicated, which premises were refuted by
admissions made on cross-examination and by the express language of written evidence, which quoted testimony even the trial judge rejected and made no finding on such defense.
As hereinafter set forth in the Statement of Points
Wherein the Appellant Alleges the Supreme Court
Erred in its Decision, and also in the Brief in Support
of Petition for Rehearing, this petition for rehearing
is based on: (a) Factual errors in the opinion, including omission of crucial admissions made by defendants
and their witnesses; (b) errors in law prejudicial to
the rights of appellant, including rights under statutes;
and (c) failure to consider any of the issues raised by
appellant an appeal, set forth in its Brief. In consequence thereof appellant claims there will be a miscarriage of justice unless such errors are corrected on
rehearing.

L I M I T A T I O N OF SCOPE OF A P P E A L
American Aggregate Corporation appealed from
only portions of the judgment as the same was modified by the trial court: (a) Paragraph 1 whereby the
trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint; (b) paragraph 6 whereby plaintiff was denied costs; (c) from
failure of the trial court to award plaintiff adequate

2
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damages; (d) failure to award plaintiff punitive damages; and (e) failure to award plaintiff any interest.
Neither the defendants Buehner nor D. W . Brimhall, the independent mining and crushing contractor,
either appealed or cross-appealed from the judgment
or any portion thereof. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
judgment and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the jugment as
modified on motion of plaintiff, have not been assailed
by any appeal.

D E C I S I O N O F T H E C O U R T ON A P P E A L
The case on appeal was set for hearing for October
16, 1974, but this Honorable Court dispensed with oral
argument. The decision written by the Honorable A.
H . Ellett, Justice, was filed October 31, 1974. The
order contained in the opinion affirms "the judgment
as made." As to the portions of the judgment appealed
from, counsel for appellant alleges that such affirmance is erroneous both as to facts and as to the law, in
the particulars hereinafter stated.

UNDISPUTED FACTS STATED
IN T H E DECISION
In the opinion of this Honorable Court it is stated,
and counsel for plaintiff-appellant fully agrees therewith, although counsel does not agree that it is a complete statement of all material undisputed facts:
"There is no dispute in regard to the following
matters:
" 1 . Bigby had filed on land under the mining

3
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laws of the United States and was doing assessment
work thereon.
"2. Rigby leased the land to American and was to
receive $1.50 per ton royalty for all quartz aggregate
mined and sold, and American was to do the assessment work.
"3. The mineral on the claim was unique white
quartzite used in making concrete slabs for use in buildings.
"4. American contracted with Brimhall to mine
and crush the quartzite and to pay $10 per ton out of
cash received when and as sales were made.
"5. Buehner Company knew of the above arrangements and had bought aggregate from American on
prior occasions.
"6. Buhner Company had a contract to furnish
slabs in connection with a large building being erected.
"7. The architect had specified the unique quartzite to be used by Buehner.
"8. Buehner tried to purchase from American but
would not agree to pay $29.50 per ton.
"9. Thereafter Buehner went to Brimhall and entered into an agreement with him to buy the aggregate
at $20.50 per ton f.o.b. Buehner's plant."
Additional undisputed facts including material and
crucial admissions made by defendants and their witnesses, and also by Brimhall, not mentioned in the opinion, are stated hereinafter in the list of errors in fact
and in law and in the Brief which would require reversal of the portions of the judgment from which appeal was taken by plaintiff.
4^
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S T A T E M E N T OF P O I N T S W H E R E I N T H E
APPELLANT ALLEGES T H E SUPREME
C O U R T E R R E D I N ITS D E C I S I O N
1. Although a judicial oversight, it was prejudicial
error for this Court to affirm paragraph 1 of the judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint with prejudice,
when the Buehner Company at the conclusion of the
trial acknowledged that it owed plaintiff money and
pretendedly "tendered" a sum without interest into
court without actually depositing any money, but merely
lodged with the clerk a check of the Buehner Company
payable to the order of "D W. Brimhall and American
Aggregate Company/'
2. This Court has overlooked the language of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment as modified by the
trial judge on motion of plaintiff (to conform to the
admissions made by Brimhall on cross-examination),
which paragraphs constitute an adjudication in favor
of plaintiff (from which no one took an appeal), that
Brimhall merely had a contract whereby he would mine
and crush quartzite for plaintiff and receive the agreed
price of $10 per ton when sales were made and nothing
more, which adjudication vitiated the unwarranted conclusionary "finding" of "joint venture" and "agency".
3. Part of this Court's opinion is predicated erroneously upon the spurious Buehner defense of "release",
inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, never executed by plaintiff, refuted by defendants' own admissions and by Exhibit 40-P which showed that the purported transaction was between defendant corporation
and a third party, on which defense the trial court made
no finding nor any adjudication in favor of defendants.
5
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4. The cases do not hold that the trier of the fact
can isolate and extract out of context some statement
of a witness and ignore his contrary admissions made
on cross-examination, nor permit a disregard of undisputed evidence including the express language of a
written document prepared and executed by the witness, nor otherwise act arbitrarily, instead of as a reasonable and intelligent person.
5. This Court has not fully considered the legal
right of plaintiff to fix and quote its own prices, and
the lack of any right on the part of defendant Buehner
Company as a competitor of plaintiff to dictate plaintiff's prices or to circumvent plaintiff's rights to sell at
its own quoted prices, or defendants' conduct which
induced Brimhall to accept $5,000 for conversion and
sale of plaintiff's materials at $20.50 per ton (which
was below plaintiff's costs), to the detriment of plaintiff and the unjust enrichment of defendants.
6. There was no competent evidence of any "joint
venture", and Exhibit I9-P could not correctly be construed as a contract with a "joint venture" since none
was named on that document which was prepared and
issued by the Buehner Company to Brimhall personally
with all proceeds payable to Brimhall and nothing to
plaintiff.
7. Exhibit 19-P, the Brimhall purchase order,
could not properly be construed to relate to any job
except the job designated thereon by job-number,
which was the new church office building job; and it
could not be construed to constitute an open-end purchase order for a multiplicity of unrelated jobs not
mentioned thereon.
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8. The Court overlooked the fact that the Buehners
never paid for 90% of the materials delivered each 30
days as specified in Exhibit 19-P, and defendants
could not equitably be excused from paying interest
after long delays.
9. It is undisputed that defendants did not issue
any purchase order to plaintiff during the period in
controversy, and there was no competent evidence of
"ratification" by plaintiff of the Brimhall purchase
order or of any claim to purchase at $20.50 per ton,
since plaintiff refused to execute the Brimhall purchase
order because it was below plaintiff's quoted prices, and
also below plaintiff's costs; but there was merely an
oral promise by plaintiff in May 1970 not to sue defendants if defendants complied with four conditions,
not one of which was performed.
10. Defendants engaged in a cover-up involving
withholding information from plaintiff for many
months, and the furnishing of false information, which
discredited defendants.
11. The figure of $20.50 per ton was below plaintiff's costs; consequently this Court erred in not considering the issue of liability of defendants for violations of the Utah Unfair Practices Act and statutes
prohibiting price-fixing and restraint of trade, which
rendered void any purported agreement oral or written
which was designed to obtain plaintiff's goods at a
price below its costs.
12. Paul Buehner practiced deceit upon Brimhall
to induce him to accept Exhibit 19-P, defendants also
attempted to practice deceit upon plaintiff, and even
practiced deceit upon the trial court by fictious claims
7
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on counterclaim and by false testimony, so that defendants and their witnesses could not reasonably be
believed by the court on any matter in conflict with
the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses and admissions of
defendants made on cross-examination, whether the
doctrine of estoppel by oath or quasi estoppel is invoked.
The foregoing points are discussed in the Brief in
Support of this Petition for Rehearing, heroto attached
and incorporated herein by reference.
Respectfully submitted,

AMERICAN AGGREGATE
CORPbRATIpN,
1

.^(kAJ^y

V_ J*

SHAJ^AS^KAAM^^

By P A U L K R E I M A N N
Attorney for Plaintiff-AppellantPetitioner

S
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
1. A L T H O U G H A J U D I C I A L
OVERSIGHT, IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
F O R T H I S C O U R T TO A F F I R M P A R A GRAPH 1 OF T H E JUDGMENT
DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS
COMPLAINT
WITH
PREJUDICE,
W H E N T H E B U E H N E R COMP A N Y AT T H E CONCLUSION OF T H E
TRIAL ACKNOWLEGED THAT IT OWED
P L A I N T I F F MONEY AND PRETENDEDLY
" T E N D E R E D " A SUM WITHOUT
INTEREST
INTO COURT W I T H O U T A C T U A L L Y D E P O S I T I N G ANY MONEY, BUT M E R E L Y
LODGED W I T H T H E CLERK A CHECK OF
T H E B U E H N E R COMPANY P A Y A B L E TO
T H E ORDER O F "D. W. B R I M H A L L A N D
AMERICAN AGGREGATE
COMPANY:'
At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Ashton on behalf of defendant Buehner Company stated, " I would
like to make a tender in court". H e said, "That is a
total of $17,132.85 which I tender into court." (R. 658,
Ab. 95). As pointed out on page 61 of the Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant
(hereinafter referred to as
"Brief"), "There was no tender or deposit in court
under Rule 67 or Rule 68, for no money was deposited
or placed under the control of the court." Rule 67
clearly contemplates that the money shall actually be
deposited with the clerk, "subject to the further direction of the court." Instead of a deposit of money with
the clerk, a corporate check dated June 6, 1973, of
Otto Buehner & Company in the sum of $17,132.85
without any interest for the many months of delay, was
9
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left with the clerk, not payable to the clerk of the court,
but to " D . W . Brimhall Company and American Aggregate Company." (Ab. 139). The clerk could not
cash such check and invest the money pending final
determination of the rights of the parties.
Defendants thereby attempted to force plaintiff
to bargain with Brimhall, and to cut off plaintiff's right
of appeal, if possible. The trial court should have
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff at least for the
amount defendant Buehner Company acknowledged it
should pay. Instead, the court was wrongfully induced
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and
place plaintiff at the whim and caprice of Brimhall, an
adverse party. The check has been stale-dated for 17
months and does not have to be honored at the bank.
During the entire period of time defendant has had
the use and benefit of the money said defendant acknowledged that it owed, by falsely pretending to
tender money into court when it had no intention of
doing so. There has been no compliance with the rule.
Defendants had no right to substitute a scheme of their
own to force the plaintiff to negotiate with Brimhall.
Even if the check were withdrawn, plaintiff could not
cash it without the consent of Brimhall, and plaintiff
would be forced into another lawsuit just because defendants were unwilling to comply with the rules and
insist on making rules of their own in defiance of the
statutes and the rules of the Court.

2. THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED
THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPHS 4 A N D
5 OF THE JUDGMENT AS MODIFIED BY
THE TRIAL JUDGE ON MOTION OF
PLAINTIFF (TO CONFORM TO THE AD10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MISSIONS MADE BY B R I M H A L L
ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION), W H I C H
PARAG R A P H S A R E AN ADJUDICATION
IN FAVOR O F P L A I N T I F F ( F R O M W H I C H NO O N E
TOOK A N A P P E A L ) , T H A T B R I M H A L L
M E R E L Y H A D A CONTRACT W H E R E B Y
H E W O U L D MINE AND CRUSH QUARTZITE FOR PLAINTIFF AND RECEIVE T H E
A G R E E D P R I C E O F $10 P E R T O N W H E N
SALES W E R E MADE AND
NOTHING
MORE, W H I C H A D J U D I C A T I O N V I T I A T E D
T H E U N W A R R A N T E D CONCLUSIONARY
"FINDING" OF 'JOINT VENTURE" AND
"AGENCY."
After reading a list of undisputed matters listed
in the opinion as paragraphs 1 to 9, counsel for plaintiff-appellant expected to read an order for reversal of
the portions of the judgment appealed from, but was
surprised to a point of profound shock, when he read
the rest of the opinion and the order for affirmance
of the entire judgment including the portions from
which plaintiff appealed. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this
Court's statement of undisputed matters are:
"4. American contracted with Brimhall to
mine and crush the quartzite and to pay $10 per
ton out of cash received when and as sales were
made.
"5. Buehner Company knew of the above arrangements and had bought aggregate on prior
occasions."
I t was also undisputed that Buehner Company
previously had purchased aggregate from American at
the regular price of $35 per ton as shown by Exhibit
11
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4-P. (R. 30-31, Ab. 4, 97-101). Paragraph 8 of the
list of undisputed facts implies that plaintiff's quoted
price was $29.50 per ton to Buehners on the quantity
for this particular job. I t is undisputed that Buehner
Company asked plaintiff for a quotation before it submitted its bid on the caststone to the prime contractor,
and that plaintiff gave the same quotation after the
Buehner Company was awarded the subcontract; and
that defendants not only tried to chisel and dictate
prices of American as their competitor to a point below cost, but resorted to deceit, overreaching, unfair
trade practices, unlawful price-fixing, and a cover-up,
to obtain unjust enrichment, and defendants even practiced deceit on the trial court; as detailed in the Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellant, and hereinafter mentioned.
In the opinion this Court states that "The trial
court found that Brimhall was a joint venturer with
plaintiff and as such was authorized to act as agent
and to make the contract to sell the rock at the price of
$20.50 per ton." The so-called "finding" was an unwarranted conclusion, contradicted by Brimhall's admissions on cross-examination, and did not constitute a
proper finding of fact. Furthermore, as hereinafter
pointed out, it was vitiated by paragraphs 4 and 5 of
the judgment as amended on motion. (Ab. 143-144).
Paragraph 8 of the findings of fact states:
"8. The defendant [on counterclaim] and the
plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation entered into a joint agreement to crush the aggregate for $10.00 per ton, which agreement was
subsequently modified to provide for payment of
$7.25 per ton." (Ab. 141).
This Court in its opinion states that "Our duty

12
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is to affirm the trial court if there is competent evidence
in the record to sustain the finding." (Undoubtedly
the last word should read "judgment"). The opinion
on page 2 proceeds to supply a "finding" not made by
the trial court which is utterly inconsistent with Brimhall's admissions on eross-examinaion and paragraphs
4 and 5 of the judgment as amended. The opinion erroneously states that "Mr. Brimhall was called as a
witness by the plainiff", when he was called for crossexamination as an adverse witness. The opinion quotes
Brimhall as testifying that
"he operated under an unsigned written agreement drawn up by counsel for American whereby he was to mine and crush the quartzite and
was to be paid $10 per ton therefor, that American was to haul the material sold and was to be
paid $8 per ton for hauling, and that $1.50 per
ton was to be paid as royalty to Bigby and the
profit, if any, made from the sale was to be
divided between American and Brimhall."
It is difficult to imagine just how someone could
operate under an unsigned written agreement, when a
document which is not executed is not a written agreement. This Court overlooks the fact that Brimhall's
statement was completely destroyed by his admissions
on cross-examination, which showed that there could not
have been any joint venture, for Brimhall contracted
to perform certain services as an independent contractor
for a flat fee of $10 per ton and no more. Those admissions on cross-examination detailed in the Brief,
clearly showed that the $10 not only covered mining
and crushing, but removing overburden, separation of
aggregate into stock piles, moving equipment in and
out, depreciation and overhead expenses, and also his

13
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anticipated profit. (R. 209, 214-216, 250, 278-279, 333335, 566-568, 605-606, 620, Ab. 27-29, 33, 36, 41-42,
80, 86-87, 89-90, 93). Brimhall was not to share any
profits or in any losses with plaintiff. Consequently,
there could not have been a joint venture.
The strange story of Brimhall quoted in part in
the opinion, not only was completely discredited by
his admissions on cross-examination, but the trial judge
could not reasonably believe it, and he did not make
any finding to support it nor incorporate such a claim
into the judgment. As pointed out hereinafter, the
judgment as amended clearly negates any claim to anything above the fixed fee. The $10 per ton guaranteed
to Brimhall for all of his services, included a profit of
$3 per ton over the prevailing price in the area of $7
per ton which also included a profit. Brimhall claimed
that plantiff was allowed to recover only two items of
expense, $1.50 for royalty and $8 for hauling regardless of distance, or a total of only $9.50 per ton regardless of the many additional costs and expenses of plaintiff, and then split the difference with Brimhall for the
sale proceeds over the $19.50 per ton. Reasonable
minds could not conclude that an attorney would write
such a weird document which would guarantee the
adverse party a profit both ways and make certain that
his own client would suffer a loss. Obviously, if such
an absurd "agreement" had been submitted to Brimhall, he would not have hesitated to sign it. The trial
judge, particularly in the amendment of the judgment,
completely rejected such an unconscionable claim.
"The rule is that the testimony of a witness is no
stronger than where it is left on cross-examination."
Obert v. Saunders, 111 Utah 507, 518, 184 P . 2d 229.
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This applies, of course, not only to admissions made by
Brimhall, but also to the admissions made by Paul
Buehner and other witnesses for defendants. Brimhall
admitted that he never was paid anything in excess of
$10 per ton, although the regular price of the aggregate
was $35 per ton. Competent evidence must include the
admissions made by a party, and exclude testimony
destroyed by the witness on his cross-examination.
Counsel for appellant was shocked to learn that
counsel for defendants prepared and had the trial court
sign a judgment which awarded judgment to Brimhall
against plaintiff for $37,149.00 without any credit for
the $29,000.00 Brimhall had collected, and which allowed Brimhall for himself the $5,000.00 "move-in
cost" paid to him by the Buehners. Counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to modify and amend the judgment.
Counsel for Brimhall also asked for certain modifications to obtain amounts in excess of the fixed fee of $10
per ton which had been reduced to $7.25 per ton. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment as modified and
amended by the trial court, constitute an adjudication
in favor of the plaintiff, which vitiates any conclusionary finding of a "joint venture" and resulting "agency":
"4. Bv reason of the settlement agreement
made between plaintiff A M E R I C A N AGG R E G A T E C O R P O R A T I O N and D . W .
B R I M H A L L on July 9, 1970, D. W . B R I M H A L L became entitled to $7.25 per ton instead
of $10.00 per ton for his mining and crushing
services on all tonnage of aggregate shipped to
defendant O T T O B U E H N E R & C O M P A N Y
totaling 5,172 tons, less a credit of $29,000.00
collected bv D . W . B R I M H A L L on the first
4,000 tons shipped to defendant O T T O B U E H N E R k C O M P A N Y in 1969 and 1970, leaving
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a balance of $8,497.00 payable to D . W .
B R I M H A L L computed at the rate of $7.25
per ton for the 1172 tons in excess of the first
4.000 tons, which amount shall be payable to him
out of the money deposited or to be deposited in
court by defendant O T T O B U E H N E R &
COMPANY.
"5. Under said settlement agreement, as to
said 5,172 tons, D . W . B R I M H A L L was not
entitled to $5,000.00 'move-in-costs' paid to him
by O T T O B U E H N E R & C O M P A N Y , nor
to make any other charge against plaintiff in
excess of said $7.25 per ton." (R. 941). (Italics
added).
Neither Brimhall nor the defendants took any appeal or cross-appealed from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
judgment as modified and amended, and such judgment is conclusive and cannot be impeached by a conclusionary "finding" of "joint venture" and resulting
"agency" which the trial court finally adjudicated to
the contrary, based upon Brimhalls own sworn admissions. The judgment as amended did not include any
adjudication that there was either a "joint venture" or
an "agency". Nor do conclusions of law 4 and 5 as
amended give credence to any theory of "joint venture" or "agency."
Rule 54 (a) clearly states that a " 'Judgment' as
used in these rules includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies." No right of appeal exists
from a mere finding. Nor can a mere finding overturn
the judgment itself. As observed by the Supreme J u dicial Court of Massachusetts in Olsen v. Qhen, 2 N. E .
2d 475, 476:
"Ordinarily only a final judgment or decree,
as distinguished from a mere finding, amounts
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to an adjudication or becomes evidence of a fact
in another case. * * *
"A fact merely found becomes adjudicated
by a final judgment or decree only when it is
shown to have been the basis of the relief, denial
of relief or other ultimate right established by
the judgment or decree. * * *"
3. P A R T O F T H I S C O U R T S O P I N I O N I S
PREDICATED ERRONEOUSLY UPON T H E
SPURIOUS B U E H N E R D E F E N S E OF "RELEASE", INADMISSIBLE UNDER
THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, NEVER EXECUTED BY P L A I N T I F F , R E F U T E D BY
D E F E N D A N T S ' OWN ADMISSIONS AND
B Y E X H I B I T 40-P W H I C H S H O W E D T H A T
T H E PURPORTED TRANSACTION WAS
BEWEEN
DEFENDANT
CORPORATION
A N D A T H I R D P A R T Y , ON W H I C H D E F E N S E T H E T R I A L COURT M A D E NO
F I N D I N G NOR ANY ADJUDICATION IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
The last 12 lines of page 2 and the first 7 lines
of page 3 of the opinion quote from the testimony of
Paul Buehner on a challenged defense of "release" and
"ratification" relating to preparation of some molds.
The evidence is conclusive that the transaction was not
between defendants and plaintiff, but between the
Buehner Company and Style-Crete, Inc., which was
not a party to the suit. The testimony of Buehner was
inadmissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, for he
tried to contradict and vary the terms of a written
document relating to the molds, Exhibit 40-P which
was prepared by defendant Otto Buehner & Company
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and executed by said defendant company and
Crete, Inc., never by plaintiff.

Style-

The transaction relating to the molds for oxen
for the Ogden and Provo temples on which StyleCrete, Inc. had the subcontracts for cast-stone, never
was negotiated with plaintiff at all. Reasonable minds
would be compelled to conclude that if such transaction
was to constitute an agreement with plaintiff for reduction by plaintiff of the price of aggregate to $20.50
per ton (which was below plaintiff's costs), defendant
Otto Buehner & Company would have made plaintiff
a party to the document by signature and specified that
figure of $20.50 per ton in that document. Buehner
tied the purportedly "agreed reduction" in price down
to $20.50 a ton to the transaction relating to the molds
for oxen, which was not a transaction involving plaintiff at all, but one with a third party, Style-Crete, Inc.,
which was not a party to the suit and which had no
interest in the aggregate: Exhibit 40-P prepared by
the Buehner Company to finalize the transaction relating to the molds, omitted any mention of any aggregate
or any price on aggregate owned by American Aggregate. Obviously, if Buehners could have escaped liability by such a transaction, they would not have neglected
to mention it in the written agreement.
Exhibit 40-P is dated March 18, 1971, prepared
by Otto Buehner & Company and submitted to StyleCrete, Inc., does not mention plaintiff's name, and
made no reference to the aggregate owned by American
Aggregate Corporation. Buehner's testimony on direct
examination was destroyed on cross-examination. Instead of the Buehner company being so generous as
Paul Buehner tried to picture in his misleading testi18
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mony, Exhibit 40-P (Ab. 126) prepared by his company March 18, 1971, and accepted March 24, 1971, by
Style-Crete, Inc., clearly shows that Otto Buehner &
Company merely furnished models for oxen, two plaster
casts and one concrete. Style-Crete, Inc., did not receive any finished models at all, for the agreement
stated:
«* * * Style Crete, Inc. is to have rubber molds
made for these fonts using the above named
models. After the precast units for the above
captioned temples are produced, the molds and
models are to be delivered to and become the
property of the Otto Buehner § Company. I n
addition, Style Crete, Inc., shall pay to Otto
Buehner & Company, the sum of
$2,000.00."
(Italics added).
Style-Crete, Inc., had the expense of making the
finished molds and models, and after Style-Crete, Inc.,
completed the precast units for the Ogden and Provo
Temples, those molds and models were to be delivered
to Otto Buehner & Company and become its properties.
Those finished molds and models prepared by StyleCrete, which the Buehner Company needed for the
Washington Temple, cost thousands of dollars.
The trial court did not make any finding "nor any
adjudication in favor of defendants Buehner on the
fictitious defense of "release". I t was conclusive that
plaintiff was not a party to that transaction at all, and
that if defendants had intended to get a "release" they
would have made plaintiff a party to Exhibit 40-P and
would have had plaintiff execute it.
4. T H E C A S E S D O N O T H O L D T H A T
T H E T R I E R O F T H E F A C T CAN I S O L A T E
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A N D E X T R A C T OUT O F C O N T E X T SOME
STATEMENT OF A WITNESS AND IGNORE
H I S C O N T R A R Y A D M I S S I O N S M A D E ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION, NOR P E R M I T A
DISREGARD OF UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE
INCLUDING T H E EXPRESS LANGUAGE
OF A W R I T T E N DOCUMENT P R E P A R E D
AND E X E C U T E D BY T H E WITNESS, NOR
OTHERWISE
ACT ARBITRARILY,
INSTEAD OF AS A REASONABLE A N D INT E L L I G E N T PERSON.
We are aware of the rule that the trial court should
be affirmed if there is sufficient competent evidence in
the record to support the judgment. However, in DeFas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133 at 137, 369 P . 2d 290,
cited in the footnote, this Honorable Court said:
«# * * The court's prerogative of course does
not go so far as to stubbornly ignore and refuse
to be guided by credible, uncontradicted evidence
when all reasonable minds would accept it. That
could result in arbitrary and unreasoning denial
or distortion of justice. Nevertheless, because of
the prerogative just mentioned as judge of all
aspects of the case, if the testimony of a witness
is affected with any frailty which might reasonably be considered as casting suspicion upon it
or discrediting its accuracy or truthfulness, the
court is not bound to accept such tesimony as
the fact and so find. And the rule is not otherwise because the witness happened to be a party
to the action."
On page 1 of the opinion this Court states 9 items
of undisputed facts, which counsel for plaintiffs believe
would require a reversal of the portion of the judgment
from which an appeal was taken; but there are addi-
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tional facts undisputed in the record which the trial
court, (which was unable to try the case on successive
days), overlooked or possibly forgot in the delay before a memorandum was issued. The trial judge upon
subsequent motion by counsel for plaintiff did amend
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the conclusions of law and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment, which remedied the
damage as to Brimhall.
On page 2 of the opinion the Court quotes a small
portion of the testimony of Paul Buehner in which
he said that he had a conversation with Don Reimann
(vice-president of plaintiff) in which Buehner said that
'w'e had a purchase order with Mr. Chidester and that
if we were going to change it we had to know immediately" and Buehner said he could "work it out with
Mr. Brimhall" and Don said, "yes, you go ahead."
Buehner only told a half-truth, for Don Reiman told
Buehner he could deal with Brimhall as to sizes, not as
to prices. (R. 365-366, Ab. 48). On cross-examination
Buehner admitted that he knew it had been the practice all along to give the aggregate sizes to the crushing
contractor. (R. 156, Ab. 21).
The opinion omits entirely the admissions made by
Buehner on cross-examination, which not only show
that he had to deal with plaintiff on prices, but that
Buehner used Brimhall as an agent or tool to attempt
to get plaintiff to lower the special quoted price of
$29.50 per ton (which was $5.50 below the regular price
of $35 per ton). First Buehner said the price was "too
high." Don Reimann told him that $29.50 per ton was
the same quotation to everyone for that quantity. (R.
336-337, Ab. 42). Buehner then falsely represented
that he could purchase that material or similar material
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from Chidester for $19.50 a ton. I t is undisputed that
Don Reimann said "they couldn't get that material unless they stole it from us. I t was specified on the job."
Buehner falsely represented that they could substitute
materials, but Don Reimann said he found out from the
architect that no substitutions would be allowed. (R.
337-339, Ab. 42-43). Plainiff refused to lower its
quotation. Reasonable minds would have to conclude
that plaintiffs officers would not consent to lowering
the price to $20.50 a ton (which was below plaintiffs
total costs), when no one except plaintiff could then
furnish such materials. Furthermore, plaintiff never
signed any document enforceable under the Statute of
Frauds, to sell at the below-cost of $20.50 a ton.
Buehner admitted on cross-examination that he
then "had Mr. Brimhall go back and forth to American
Aggregate Corporation several times." (R. 45, Ab. 6).
For whose benefit? Obviously for the benefit of the
Buehners, for Buehner admitted that he told Brimhall
to tell plaintiff that the "price was too high" and to
talk to Don and Rich Reimann to see if they would
lower the figure. (R. 47-48, Ab. 6-7). After some
further discussions Buehner falsely represented to
Brimhall that the Buehners planned to take all sizes
or what was known as crusher run instead of "selected
sizes", and Brimhall said it would make considerable
difference in the quotation. Buehner testified that he
told Brimhall to find out what kind of a quote American Aggregate would give on "crusher run." Buehner
admitted that Mr. Brimhall reported back from plaintiff a quotation of $25.50 per ton for "crusher run",
and that it was the lowest figure plaintiff would take;
but Buehner said, "No deal/9 (R. 45-47, Ab. 6).
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From all of Buehner's admissions, reasonable
minds would have to conclude that Buehners knew that
the plaintiff would not lower its quotation to $20.50
per ton and that plaintiff would not accept a purchase
order for a below-cost price of $20.50 per ton.
5. T H I S C O U R T H A S N O T F U L L Y CONSIDERED T H E LEGAL RIGHT OF PLAINT I F F TO F I X A N D QUOTE I T S OWN
PRICES, AND T H E LACK OF ANY R I G H T
ON T H E P A R T O F D E F E N D A N T B U E H N E R
COMPANY AS A COMPETITOR OF PLAINT I F F TO D I C T A T E P L A I N T I F F ' S P R I C E S
OR
TO
CIRCUMVENT
PLAINTIFF'S
R I G H T S TO S E L L A T I T S O W N Q U O T E D
P R I C E S , OR T H E U N C O N S C I O N A B L E CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS W H I C H INDUCED
B R I M H A L L TO A C C E P T $5,000 F O R CONV E R S I O N A N D S A L E O F P L A I N T I F F ' S MAT E R I A L S A T $20.50 P E R T O N ( W H I C H W A S
B E L O W P L A I N T I F F ' S COSTS), T O T H E
D E T R I M E N T OF P L A I N T I F F AND T H E
UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF DEFENDANTS.
Otto Buehner & Company and its controlling officer Paul Buehner had no right to dictate or fix plaintiff's prices nor conspire with Brimhall or with any
one else to fix those prices to the advantage of defendants and detriment of plaintiff. This is entirely overlooked in the opinion, along with the undisputed evidence as to what occurred behind the backs of plaintiff's
officers. Buehners knew the price of the plaintiff's aggregate before plaintiff submitted its bid to the prime
contractor. That price was $29.50 per ton for "selected
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sizes" instead of the regular price of $35 per ton. After
the Buehner Company obtained the subcontract on the
caststone, plaintiff again furnished the identical quotation of $29.50 a ton. The Buehners arbitrarily declared they would not pay that much, and Paul Buehner said that if he couldn't get this material at his price,
he was going to have a substitution. (R. 221-222, Ab.
30). H e thereby threatened to cheat the prime contractor and the Church as owner by a substitution
which he knew was not authorized.
When Buehner said "No deal" to Brimhall when
he reported $25.50 a ton quotation from plaintiff on
"crusher run", and told Buehner that plaintiff would
not go below $25.50, Buehner then offered Brimhall
$20.50 a ton plus $5,000 "move-in", if Brimhall would
sign a purchase order with the Buehners. Brimhall
accepted on the basis of Buehner's promise to take all
sizes or "crusher run." I t was undisputed from Brimhall's admissions on cross-examination and deposition
that the contract between plaintiff as owner and Brimhall as mining and crushing contractor, whereby Brimhall was to receive $10 per ton for all services, included
moving equipment in and out of the quarry. Consequently, the $5,000 which Paul Buehner promised to
pay Brimhall if he would sign a purchase order to sell
the materials at $20.50 per ton to the Buehner Company was an illegal inducement to convert and sell
plaintiff's materials below cost to the detriment of
plaintiff and the unjust enrichment of defendants.
Neither Brimhall nor Buehner risked sending plaintiff
a copy of such purchase order, Exhibit 19-P.
Nor could there be any possible implication that
Brimhall was "acting as agent" when he acted adversely
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to plaintiff for unjust enrichment of a competitor of
plaintiff.
6. T H E R E W A S N O C O M P E T E N T E V I DENCE OF ANY "JOINT VENTURE", AND
E X H I B I T 19-P C O U L D N O T C O R R E C T L Y
B E CONSTRUED AS A CONTRACT W I T H A
"JOINT VENTURE" SINCE NONE WAS
N A M E D ON T H A T D O C U M E N T W H I C H
WAS P R E P A R E D AND ISSUED BY T H E
B U E H N E R C O M P A N Y T O B R I M H A L L PERSONALLY
W I T H ALL PROCEEDS PAYA B L E TO B R I M H A L L A N D N O T H I N G TO
PLAINTIFF.
In Koumans v. White Star Gas <§ Oil Co., 92 Utah
24, 63 P . 2d 231 it was held that a "joint venture" is
subject to the law of partnership. In Bates v. Simpson,
121 Utah 165, 239 P . 2d 749, it was held that a joint
venture, being in the nature of a partnership, cannot
arise except by consent of the parties under an agreement to share profits and losses. Brimhall expressly
disclaimed that he was to share in any losses. There
was no competent evidence of any joint venture under
the undisputed facts stated in the opinion, or under
the undisputed facts admitted by Brimhall on crossexamination. Brimhall never had been paid anything
in excess of $10 per ton although the regular price
for the aggregate was $35 per ton. (R. 278-279, 620,
Ab. 36,90).
Section 48-1-3, U. C. A., Uniform Partnership
Act, specifies that "A partnership is an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit." Brimhall was an independent contractor,
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and he was not a co-owner of the quarry lease, nor of
the aggregate, by his own admsisions under oath. Even
if there is a general partnership and not a limited partnership, Section 48-1-6(1), U.C.A. 1953, makes a
partner "an agent of the partnership for the purpose
of its business, * * * including the execution in the
partnership name of any instrument for apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership * * *." Brimhall never had conducted any sales.
From the time defendants pleaded by counterclaim
that plaintiff was a party to Exhibit 19-P, plaintiff
invoked the Parol Evidence Rule, and moved to strike,
for that purchase order did not purport to be in the
name of both Brimhall and plaintiff, for plaintiff's
name was not mentioned at all. Defendants alone prepared Exhibit 19-P. If they had entertained any belief that there was a joint venture of some kind, they
would certainly have included the names of both plaintiff and Brimhall. However, defendants specified performance solely by Brimhall as "seller", and plaintiff's
name was not even mentioned. Brimhall admitted that
under his oral agreement with plaintiff he was to be
paid the $10 a ton for all of his services when the sale
was made and the money collected. That did not give
him any right to make a contract of sale nor to collect
the money and pocket it. However, defendants made
all money payable solely to Brimhall, which negates
any concept of "joint venture." Furthermore, after
frustrating attempts of plaintiff to obtain a purchase
order from defendant Buehner Company, and to find
out what was going on, the president of plaintiff corporation in February 1970, asked defendant's office
manager when plaintiff was going to be paid for the
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aggregate going out of plaintiff's leasehold to the Buehner plant, and said manager bluntly told plaintiff's
president, "You are not going to get paid/' (R. 451453, Ab. 61-62). Thus, defendants did not intend that
the money for the aggregate under Exhibt 19-P would
be paid to any one except Brimhall.
There was a conclusive reason why neither Brimhall nor either of the defendants was willing to even
send plaintiff a copy of the putative "purchase order."
Not only was all of the money made payable exclusively
to Brimhall, but Exhibit 19-P would have revealed that
the Buehner Company had wrongfully agreed to give
Brimhall $5,000 for turning over to the Buehner Company plaintiff's aggregate at the below-cost figure of
$20.50 a ton as unlawfully dictated by the Buehners,
under the vicious subterfuge of "move-in-costs". Brimhall admitted under oath that the $10 a ton included
everything, including "moving equipment in and out"
of the quarry. Consequently, the promise of $5,000 was
an unlawful inducement to Brimhall to sign a document under which the Buehner Company would be
enabled to divert 4,000 tons of plaintiff's aggregate
from the quarry to the Buehner plant for conversion
to the use and benefit and unjust enrichment of defendants, and to the detriment of plaintiff as owner.
Since plaintiff knew that the Buehners had to have
that material owned by plaintiff, and plaintiff had refused to allow the Buehners to dictate the price for
plaintiff's materials, if either Brimhall or defendants
had dared to send plaintiff a copy of Exhibit 19-P,
plaintiff would have taken measures to stop the looting
operation. Defendants knew Brimhall had no right to
sell because they repeatedly had obtained quotations
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from plaintiff directly, then used Brimhall as their
agent or tool to attempt to get lower quotations down
o the last minute before conspiring to defraud plaintiff. Defendants knew that plaintiff would not accept
a purchase order at $20.50 per ton or for less than
plaintiff's quoted prices.
The Buehner Company then secretly made a written contract with Clark Tank Lines to haul 4,000 tons,
dated November 11, 1969, Exhibit 5-D (Ab. 102. That
was not even disclosed to plaintiff until after commencement of the trial. The plaintiff was told by Brimhall that the Buehners were going to use the aggregate,
and told plaintiff it should start hauling. Then the
Buehner plant manager told plaintiff's drivers to stop
hauling because the bins at the Buehner plant "were
crowded." H e so admitted at the trial. (R. 485, Ab.
69.) The trial judge was in error in suspending the
Parol Evidence Rule to make the plaintiff a party to
Exhibit 19-P. The opinion of this Court fails to
correct that prejudicial error. No trier of the fact could
reasonably find that defendants were dealing honestly
and conscientiously with plaintiff, in the light of the
undisputed facts, most of which are not included in the
opinion.
7. E X H I B I T 19-P, T H E B R I M H A L L P U R CHASE ORDER, COULD NOT P R O P E R L Y
B E C O N S T R U E D TO R E L A T E TO A N Y J O B
EXCEPT T H E JOB DESIGNATED THEREON B Y J O B N U M B E R , W H I C H W A S T H E
NEW CHURCH BUILDING JOB; AND IT
COULD NOT BE CORRECTLY CONSTRUED
TO C O N S T I T U T E A N O P E N - E N D P U R -
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CHASE ORDER FOR A MULTIPLICITY OF
UNRELATED JOBS NOT MENTIONED
THEREON.
The trial court erroneously construed Exhibit 19P to relate to any and all construction contracts Buehners might have, regardless of tonnage involved, notwithstanding said "purchase order" to which plaintiff
never was a party, specifically designated Job No.
9-267, which was the job number for the church office
building project, because of the following provision,
(which was safeguard provision to prevent shortage
in supply for a specific job) :
"In the event additional material is needed
said D. W. Brimhall will furnish said quantities
of aggregate to Otto Buehner & Co. within 30
days of notice of same by OBC to Mr. Brimhall,
his successors or assignees, and at the same price
as the original order and under said provisions
as to quality."
The total tonnage of aggregate used on the church
building project, Job No. 9-267, as shown by Exhibit
16-D, was only 3,355 tons, or 645 tons less than the
4,000 tons stated in Exhibit 19-P. Defendants recognized that said purchase order was not for any other
tonnage than contemplated on the church building project in Salt Lake City by Exhibit 30-P, the settlement
stubs on two checks mailed by the Buehners to Brimhall in March 1971, more than 6 months after the Buehners had hauled away hundreds of tons of aggregate
for other construction jobs. By Exhibit 30-P (Ab.
118) reference was made to only the 4,000 tons mentioned in the purchase order accepted by Brimhall, Exhibit 19-P, not the additional hundreds of tons Buehner
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Company had taken for other unrelated jobs in August
and September 1970.
At the trial defendants contended that notwithstanding less than 4,000 tons of aggregate had been
used on the church office building, (Job No. 9-267),
and although plaintiff never executed acceptance nor
endorsed Exhibit 19-P, and never became a party to
it, the Buehner Company was entitled to obtain any
amount of plaintiff's aggregate at the price of $20.50
per ton (which was below plaintiff's costs), for any
job although entirely unrelated to Job No. 9-267 referred to in Exhibit 19-P.
That the Buehners did not so construe Exhibit
19-P in June 1970, is shown by the fact that Paul
Buehner asked Richard C. Reimann, president of plaintiff for a quotation on several hundred tons for another job, which he certainly would not have done if
he had claimed Exhibit 19-P covered any and every
construction job regardless of job number or location.
H e was quoted the regular price of $35 per ton. (R.
459-460, Ab. 63). During the same month Marvin Allred, plant superintendent for Buehners called Don Reimann for a quotation on a job at the B.Y.U. and he
also was given a quotation at the regular price of $35
a ton. Plaintiff hauled some of the tonnage, although
Buehners never issued any purchase order. As to the
balance, the Buehners had Clark Tank Lines haul additional tonnage for those other jobs over a period of
two months without making any disclosure as to tonnage for nearly a year.
On December 31, 1970, plaintiff billed the Buehner Company, Exhibit 27-P (Ab. 118) at $35 a ton,
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for some extra tonnage plaintiff was able to determine
that said defendant had hauled away in August and
September 1970 plus some tonnage delivered by plaintiff. Said defendant ignored the billing and gave no
accounting, until June 1971 when suit became a certainty. Said defendant then sent Exhibit 24-P showing
the tonnage hauled by Clark Tank Lines and Christensen Feed & Seed. (Ab. 114). Some time in June
1971, many months after defendant Buehner Company
obtained the additional tonnage, said defendant sent a
check of an undisclosed amount to Brimhall, which
Brimhall returned to the Buehner Company for reasons
explained in a letter dated July 28, 1971, addressed to
legal counsel for the Buehner Company, Exhibit 34-P
(Ab. 125). In that letter Brimhall stated:
"You stated they (American Aggregate) are
demanding $35.00 per ton, when purchase order
was for $20.50. Purchase Order No. U 09868,
Job No. 9-267 was for the job I negotiated for.
Approximately 4,000 ton for the Church office
building.
"* * * Mr. Paul Buehner called me, D. W.
Brimhall, and said he would need possibly 700
tons for another job. I told him I had no authority to sell or quote a price on material for any
other job or jobs and that he would have to
negotiate with Mr. Don Reimann."
As revealed by Brimhall's admissions on deposition
and also at the trial, just prior to the meeting of Brimhall and Buehner with plaintiff's officers about May
1, 1970, Buehner called Brimhall and said he anticipated needing an additional 700 tons (which could not
possibly relate to the Job No. 9-267 mentioned in Exhibit 19-P since the needs on that job proved to be
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less than 4,000 tons). I t is undisputed that Brimhall
told Buehner that he would have to get in touch with
American Aggregate and make a deal, and that such
additional material would have to be at a different
quote. Further,
" I informed him (Buehner) at this time that
I had already overstepped my bounds with
American Aggregate and that I had problems,
and he would have to negotiate this with American Aggregate." (R. 232-233, 291-293, Ab. 3132,37).
Brimhall himself, who became an adverse party
to plaintiff in the litigation, admitted that he negotiated with Buehner only on the church office job and
that said purchase order did not relate to any other
job, and he acknowledged he had exceeded his authority in doing that, which was obvious from his other admissions. The Buehners certainly would not have asked
plaintiff for a quotation on other jobs if they then had
entertained the slightest idea they could enlarge Exhibit 19-P to relate to jobs other than Job No. 9-267.
The trial judge in utter disregard of the Parol
Evidence Rule, misconstrued Exhibit 19-P not only
as binding on plaintiff when plaintiff's name was not
even mentioned, but even amended and enlarged the
terms to cover any and all other jobs not even mentioned or referred to therein, to condone defendants'
taking of additional plaintiff's aggregate at the belowcost price of $20.50 a ton, to the detriment of plaintiff
and the unjust enrichment of defendants. The Buehner
Company did not pay anything for the extra 1172 tons
nor deposit any money therefor. Besides that, the difference between $20.50 and the regular quoted price of
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$35 a ton, amounts to $14.50 per ton, or a total of an
additional $16,993.00, on the extra tonnage. Plaintiff
has never actually been paid a cent for any of the extra
1,172 tons as pointed out under Point I. This Court
certainly should not allow such financial disaster to
be meted out to plaintiff or condone the unjust enrichment of defendant Buehner Company, by upholding the trial court's misinterpretation of Exhibit 19-P
prepared by defendants, in the light of the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds.
8. T H E C O U R T O V E R L O O K E D
THE
FACT THAT T H E BUEHNERS
NEVER
P A I D F O R 90% O F T H E M A T E R I A L S D E L I V E R E D E A C H 30 D A Y S S P E C I F I E D I N
E X H I B I T 19-P, A N D D E F E N D A N T S C O U L D
NOT E Q U I T A B L Y BE E X C U S E D FROM
PAYING INTEREST A F T E R LONG DELAYS.
The trial court prejudicially disregarded the fact
that the Buehner Company never complied with the
terms of Exhibit 19-P as to payment. Buehners prepared that document which specified that "90% of the
value of material will be paid within 30 days of receipt
of same" and "Final payment will be made upon
completion in full of said order and within 30 days of
said completion." Buehner never paid any attention to
either of those requirements, and never even paid to
Brimhall on time except on the first installment. Payment was delayed for months. The Buehner Company
simply failed to acknowledge that it had received the
materials when they were received, until it issued Exhibit 24-P in June 1971. The final payment on the
4,000 tons was not even mude until March 1971.
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Nevertheless, by the judgment the trial court did
not allow any interest, but in effect excused said defendant from paying interest on the amounts it admittedly owed, but did not actually pay. Such failure
of the trial court to award interest was clearly inequitable, and it should not be ratified by this Court.
9. I T I S U N D I S P U T E D T H A T D E F E N D ANTS D I D NOT ISSUE ANY PURCHASE
ORDER TO P L A I N T I F F D U R I N G
THE
P E R I O D IN CONTROVERSY, AND
THERE
WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF "RATIFICATION" B Y P L A I N T I F F O F T H E B R I M H A L L P U R C H A S E O R D E R OR O F A N Y
C L A I M TO P U R C H A S E A T $20.50 P E R TON,
S I N C E P L A I N T I F F R E F U S E D TO E X E CUTE T H E BRIMHALL PURCHASE ORDER
BECAUSE IT WAS BELOW PLAINTIFF'S
QUOTED PRICES AND ALSO
BELOW
P L A I N T I F F ' S COSTS; BUT T H E R E W A S
M E R E L Y AN ORAL PROMISE BY PLAINT I F F I N M A Y 1970 N O T TO S U E D E F E N D ANTS I F DEFENDANTS COMPLIED W I T H
FOUR CONDITIONS, NOT ONE OF W H I C H
WAS PERFORMED.
It is undisputed that neither of defendants issued
any purchase order to plaintiff for any of the plaintiff's
aggregate taken during the period in controversy. The
only purchase order ever issued was Exhibit 19-P,
issued to Brimhall, the independent mining and crushing contractor who expressly admitted he exceeded his
authority, but claimed Buehner resorted to pressure to
induce him to sign.
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The trial court made a "finding" (actually an unwarranted conclusion) of "ratification", but as shown
under Point I I of appellant's Brief, the evidence
required a finding that when plaintiff was shown Exhibit 19-P about May 1, 1970, the officers of plaintiff
refused to sign it because it was not at the prices
quoted by plaintiff and the figure of $20.50 per ton
was below plaintiffs costs. (R. 358-360, 453-458, Ab.
47-48, 62-63). That most certanly did not constitute
a ratification. There was no competent evidence of ratification, for American Aggregate refused to sign or
endorse the Brimhall purchase order Exhibit 19-P. At
that meeting Brimhall said "there were some pretty
hot words uttered." (R. 286, Ab. 37). Paul Buehner
admitted that Rich Reimann asked him if he was in
the habit of letting his janitor sign purchase orders
for him. (R. 153-154, Ab. 21).
It was undisputed that at said meeting Don Reimann asked Buehner if he was going to make up the
difference in price, and he said he would not. Buehner
admitted that he stated that whatever difference there
was between the quoted price of American Aggregate
and Brimhall, Brimhall would have to take care of it;
and Buehner also said that he "had a deal" with Brimhall and a signed contract and he was going to hold
him to it. (R. 153-154, Ab. 21).
It was undenied also that Brimhall said he was
unable to make up the difference, and that the Reimanns withdrew and conferred, and then stated that
under certain conditions "we would not bring suit
against Buehner." Four conditions were specified: (1)
"We had to have weigh tickets monthly." (2) "We had
to have an accounting of payments monthly up to date."
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(3) "The money had to be paid to American Aggregate." (4) Under no condition was any more than
4,000 tons to be taken out of that quarry, and if it was,
it had to be paid at the full price of $35 a ton." The
accounting had to be made every month so plaintiff
could settle with lessors on royalty. (R. 362-363, Ab.
48).
Paul Buehner testified, "We did all of those conditions", but declined to state what was done. (R.
147, 151-152, Ab. 20). Buehner admitted he promised
copies of weigh tickets, and said "we have done that",
but when asked for proof he hedged and said he did
not handle those matters. (R. 156, Ab. 21). Defendants produced no proof of compliance with any of those
four conditions. Brimhall admitted that "Don said they
would not sue if they got a proper accounting each
month, copies of weight tickets, and payment each
month." Brimhall said he didn't deny that it was stated
that if any material in excess of 4,000 tons was taken,
it would be at the rate of $35 a ton. (R. 234, Ab. 32).
Obviously, if plaintiff then had filed suit to stop the
job the Church would have been delayed, and the prime
contractor, other subcontractors and other innocent
people would have been injured.
An oral promise not to sue if certain conditions
were performed, none of which were complied with,
certainly could not constitute a ratification. There is
detailed in the appellant's Brief the flagrant non-compliance by defendants with those four conditions, and
the falsity of the statement of Buehner that "We did
all of those conditions", when there was a maze of misleading information, captious delays, and conduct which
endangered plaintiff's lease on the quarry, but no com36
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pliance with the conditions. Consequently, plaintiff
was not barred from suing defendants.
As pointed out by this Court in Jones v. Mutual
Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223,17 P . 2d 256, 259, 85 A L R
908, "ratification" is the adoption by one person of an
act in his behalf by another, acting as his agent without authority. The one who is charged with "ratification" must be provided with all of the material facts.
Brimhall was not an agent of plainiff, but assuming
arguendo that plaintiff even had made him an agent
by a written instrument, he did not act in behalf of
plainiff at all, but adversely and to the detriment of
plaintiff, for Exhibit 19-P did not purport to allow
plaintiff one cent. It did not mention plaintiff and
provided for payment of the money entirely to Brimhall. Nor was there a disclosure of all material facts,
for neither Brimhall nor the Buehners disclosed even
at the time of the meeting of May 1970, that Brimhall
already had been paid a substantial part of what the
Buehner Company had agreed to pay him. The Buehners continued to ignore plaintiff's condition as to payment down to June 29, 1970, by paying exclusively to
Brimhall, and never paying directly to plaintiff.
The trial court committed prejudicial error by
finding a "ratification" when plaintiff merely conditionally promised not to sue, and since the Buehners
did not comply, plaintiff had a right to sue. The trial
court committed prejudicial error in dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, for reasons hereinabove
and herein stated. The opinion of this Court entirely
overlooks the undisputed evidence which shows there
was no competent evidence of "ratification" or payment
as required nor other performance by defendants.
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10. D E F E N D A N T S E N G A G E D I N A COVER-UP INVOLVING W I T H H O L D I N G INFORMATION
FROM
PLAINTIFF
FOR
MANY MONTHS, AND T H E FURNISHING
OF FALSE INFORMATION, W H I C H DISCREDITED DEFENDANTS.
The Brief of appellant points briefly to information withheld, and apparently this Court has overlooked it entirely. Neither Brimhall nor the Buehners
saw fit to send plaintiff a copy of Exhibit 19-P. Buehner expressly admitted that no copy was ever sent.
(R. 147, Ab. 20). Defendants concealed until the time
of trial, the issuance of a contract to Clark Tank Lines
for hauling 4,000 tons of plaintiff's aggregate, Exhibit 5-D dated November 11, 1969. That document
refers to Job No. 9-267. Part of the cover-up involved
Brimhall's telling plaintiff that Buehners were going to
use the aggregate and to start hauling, so that plaintiff
would be lulled into a sense of security and anticipate a
purchase order. Then the Buehner plant superintendent
admittedly told the plaintiff's drivers in November
1969 not to bring any more material in because "our
bins were crowded." (R. 485, Ab. 69). However,
Clark Tank Lines continued to haul, as was subsequently revealed at the trial.
Defendants withheld weigh tickets promised, and
also withheld any accounting, except an inadequate
letter dated June 16, 1970, (Exhibit 25-P, which gave
no tonnage and the amounts shown as paid were less
than the amounts actually received. Such letter did not
reveal the actual tonnage obtained nor disclose that
the $5,000 for pretended "movein" was included.
Paul Buehner neglected to respond to telephone
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calls when plaintiff's officers called to obtain information, and finally referred them to Brimhall
who was leaving for Mexico. Defendant promised to
furnish accountings and weigh tickets so that plaintiff could comply with the requirements of its lease on
the quarry; but defendants failed and neglected to do
so. No weigh tickets were ever furnished. Clark Tank
Lines and Christensen Feed & Seed furnished plaintiff
reports on tonnage hauled which were understated by
as much as 50%, and not until June 1971, just before
suit was filed, did the defendant corporation condescend
to furnish any semblance of an accurate account of
tonnage hauled by contract carriers Clark and by
Christensen.
When plaintiff told Clark Tank Lines to stop
hauling, when plaintiff was unable to extract information, plaintiff was told to "go to hell." (R. 372-378,
Ab. 49-50). The Buehner Company office manager in
February 1970, when asked when plaintiff was going
to be paid, bluntly declared, "You are not going to get
paid." (R. 451-453, Ab. 61-62). Reasonable minds
would have to conclude that the defendants were discredited by their unconscionable conduct and declarations, and their manifestations of intent to defraud the
plaintiff.
11. T H E F I G U R E O F $20.50 P E R T O N
W A S B E L O W P L A I N T I F F S C O S T S ; CONS E Q U E N T L Y , T H I S COURT E R R E D I N N O T
CONSIDERING T H E ISSUE OF L I A B I L I T Y
OF D E F E N D A N T S FOR VIOLATIONS OF
T H E U T A H U N F A I R P R A C T I C E S ACT A N D
STATUTES PROHIBITING PRICE-FIXING
AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE, W H I C H REN-
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D E R E D VOID ANY P U R P O R T E D AGREEM E N T O R A L OR W R I T T E N W H I C H W A S
DESIGNED
TO O B T A I N
PLAINTIFF'S
GOODS A T A P R I C E B E L O W I T S COSTS.
The claim of illegality of defendants' conduct
under the statutes was urged from the beginning by
plaintiff's counsel. Apparently the trial court adopted
the unfounded argument of the counsel for defendants
that those statutes were "inapplicable" or "unconstitutional". No defense of "unconstitutionality" of either
statute was urged in the brief filed by respondents.
Counsel merely attempted to cite an unfinished case in
the Federal court to assert that the Utah Unfair Practices Act is inapplicable. Such citation has no application to this litigation.
Since Paul Buehner admitted under oath that his
company was a competitor of plaintiff in the aggregate
business, he knew that he had no right to dictate plaintiff's prices. H e knew that his company had even purchased this same kind of aggregate at $35 a ton, and he
recognized plaintiff's right to establish its own prices
for its own goods by asking plaintiff for a price quotation on 4,000 tons of selected sizes for the new church
office building job. No contention has been made in
this case that plaintiff was guilty of misleading defendants. The plaintiff quoted $29.50 a ton both before
and after Otto Buehner & Company was awarded the
subcontract on the caststone. Paul Buehner was determined his company was going to chisel and not pay
plaintiff's quoted price although he knew his company
had to have this particular material. The original Brief
details the subterfuge to which Buehner resorted,
threats of substitution to cheat and defraud the Church,
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and also the prime contractor. The tactics to which
Buehner resorted were neither ethical nor honest, nor
lawful.
Section 50-1-2 makes a person guilty of a conspiracy to defraud who enters into an agreement or combination or confederation to regulate or "fix the price
of any article or merchandise or commodity". Section
50-1-3 makes it unlawful for any corporation, agent
or person to enter into any combination or agreement
(among other things) to monopolize any part of trade
or commerce in this State. Section 50-1-6 specified that
"Any contract or agreement in violation of any provision of this chapter shall be absolutely void." Section
50-1-10 provides for treble damages. The agreement
made by the Buehners with Brimhall was to fix the
price on plaintiff's goods, not merely to defraud the
plaintiff, but to monopolize the trade in those goods
by dispossessing plaintiff.
The appendix to the Brief of Appellant quotes the
pertinent provisions of the Utah Unfair Practices Act,
Title 13, Chapter 5, U.C.A. 1953. Section 17 states
that the purpose of the act is to prohibit unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. Section 3 makes unlawful price discrimination, either which promotes monopoly or destroys or prevents competition. Section 7
makes it unlawful to offer to sell or to sell merchandise
either by a retailer or wholesale, "at less than cost as
defined in this act" to injure a competitor, or to prevent competition. "Cost includes raw materials, labor
and all overhead expenses. Section 13 makes contracts
in violation illegal and denies recovery thereon.
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Defendants not only attempted to fix plaintiff's
prices which they had no lawful right to do, but demanded discrimination in price, at a point below plaintiff's cost. When plaintiff refused, the Buehners conspired with the crushing contractor to fix those prices
below cost and to obtain plaintiffs goods at a figure
below cost. Plaintiff made its quotations available to
all persons in the field for like quantity. Plaintiff
claims a ruthless violation of both statutes herein mentioned, and detailed in its brief the acts which constituted those violations whereby defendants were unjustly enriched.
This Court has not even mentioned the issues, and
we believe those issues are of paramount importance
and should not be brushed aside. While denying that
plaintiff consented to Exhibit 19-P, which plaintiff did
not execute nor ratify, because it was at a figure below plaintiff's cost, even if plaintiff had consented and
signed such a contract, it would have been void. The
evidence is clear that plaintiff's expenses including
overhead expenses, exceeded the figure of $20.50 per
ton. While the trial court refused to allow plaintiff to
establish in detail those expenses, Brimhall himself told
what some of them were, so that the record clearly
shows that $20.50 per ton was below plaintiff's costs,
as detailed in appellant's Brief. Futhermore, the conduct of defendants was unconscionable and resulted in
unjust and unlawful enrichment of defendants.
12. P A U L B U E H N E R P R A C T I C E D D E C E I T U P O N B R I M H A L L TO I N D U C E H I M
TO A C C E P T E X H I B I T 19-P; D E F E N D A N T S
A L S O A T T E M P T E D TO P R A C T I C E D E C E I T
UPON PLAINTIFF, AND EVEN PRACTICED
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D E C E I T UPON T H E T R I A L COURT BY FICT I T I O U S C L A I M S ON
COUNTERCLAIM
A N D B Y F A L S E T E S T I M O N Y , SO T H A T
DEFENDANTS AND T H E I R WITNESSES
COULD NOT REASONABLY BE B E L I E V E D
B Y T H E C O U R T ON A N Y M A T T E R I N CONFLICT W I T H T H E TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES AND ADMISSIONS OF
D E F E N D A N T S M A D E ON C R O S S - E X A M I N ATION, W H E T H E R T H E DOCTRINE OF
E S T O P P E L ON O A T H OR Q U A S I E S T O P P E L
IS INVOKED.
Paul Buehner failed to trick plaintiff's officers by
his false representations of substitution of materials,
and by false representations that he could obtain the
same materials elsewhere; but he did manage to deceive Brimhall. Buehner used Brimhall to attempt to
knock down plainiff's quoted prices, and then falsely
represented to Brimhall that his company planned to
take "crusher run" instead of selected sizes. When
Brimhall reported back a quotation from plaintiff of
$25.50 as the lowest figure for "crusher run", Buehner
did not only arbitrarily declared "No deal", but he then
offered Brimhall $5,000 to sign acceptance of a purchase order to sell to the Buehner Company plaintiff's
aggregate at a below-cost price of $20.50 per ton. Brimhall testified that Buehner said he was going to take
"all sizes", but when Exhibit 19-P was prepared it was
for "selected sizes" which proved that the representation which Buehner admitted that he made to Brimhall
was a hoax.
In addiion to the fraud and deceitful tactics previous mentioned and detailed in the Brief, defendants
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Buehner also practiced deceit upon the trial court which
this Honorable Court should not tolerate. By the
Buehner Company second claim in its amended counterclaim it acknowledged that the provision in Exhibit
19-P for additional aggregate referred only to the
Church job, for defendant falsely alleged that it needed
some additional material of designated sizes for the
Church office building job, and notified American Aggregate and Brimhall (which was false because American Aggregate was not a party to the purchase order
and was not notified), but they "refused" to deliver it.
(R. 715). The Buehner Company made the fictitious
claim that it was damaged $7,000 by having to crush
larger sizes of materials. The Buehners knew they had
contracted with Clark Tank Lines to haul away 4,000
tons of materials belonging to plaintiff (Exhibit 5-D);
that defendants had complete control of the hauling of
the 4,000 tons; and that Buehner employees instructed
the drivers what sizes to haul. (R. 52-59, 63-66, 187,
Ab. 7-9, 25).
To illustrate the falsity of the claims and testimony
of defendants, for over a year the Buehners would not
divulge to plaintiff as tonnage or sizes what the Buehner Company through its contract carriers had hauled
away, but defendant company continued to help itself
to such sizes of aggregate as Buehners decided to take.
I t was finally admitted at the trial under oath that the
Buehner Company had changed the sizes of the aggregates it decided to use. (R. 469-470, Ab. 65). By
its own neglect and bungling operations, the Buehner
Company left at the quarry 200 tons of the sizes it
claimed it needed, in consequence of which it falsely
claimed it had to crush 1,000 tons of jumbo size. (R.
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342, 497-502, Ab. 43, 71). To further illustrate the deceitful character of defendants' evidence, on cross-examination Marvin Allred, plant superintendent proved
that the pretended "shortage" of certain sizes was due
to the fact that the Buehners had secretly diverted
some of those materials from the Church job to an
entirely unrelated job. (R. 485-486, 494-495, Ab. 5870). Exhibit 16-D shows that the total tonnage used
on the Church office job was only 3,355 tons. Allred
had estimated that the tonnage would be 3,500. (R.
494-495, Ab. 70).
Buehners also sought unlawfully by the practice
of deceit to exact another $7,000 by a fourth claim by
falsely asserting that plaintiff (and Brimhall) had
delivered a lot of materials in excess of the Brimhall
purchase order; that said defendant paid Clark Tank
Lines $7,000 for hauling such excess materials (R.
716), when the Buehners knew they had contracted the
hauling away of those additional materials. The Buehners attempted to "add insult to injury" by urging in
court a fictitious claim that plaintiff had damaged said
defendant corporation by delivery charges of Clark
Tank Lines which Buehners had secretly contracted
and over which plaintiff had no possible control.
This Court apparently overlooked or did not consider any of the points raised by appellant. The fictitious claims of $14,000 for pretended "damages"
which the Buehners injected into the case and took
more than a day to confuse the trial court, further discredit all of defendants' testimony in any possible conflict with plaintiff's evidence.
Consequently, there is no real credible evidence to
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support defendants. Reasonable minds could not believe they told the truth when they proved facts on
cross-examination that their claims were false and
amounted to the practice of deceit upon the court, and
would justify treble damages for plaintiff even if the
quoted statutes did not so provide.
The defendants made crucial admissions in support of the claims of the plaintiff, in addition to the
undisputed facts stated in the opinion which this Court
doubtless has overlooked. Later in the trial defendants
attempted to testify contrary to their earlier admissions
and testimony, as hereinabove noted. Both Buehner
and Brimhall testified on deposition and on cross-examination in support of plaintiff's claims, then Buehner
later attempted to contradict or twist those admissions,
but the trial court erroneously refused to allow plaintiff to rebut the attempted contradictions those prior
admissions.
As aptly stated in 31 C.J.S. Sec. 117 (b) Judicial
estoppel:
"The rule is well established that during the
course of litigation a party is not permitted to
assume or occupy inconsistent and contradictory
positions, and while this rule is frequently refered to as 'judicial estoppel', it more properly
is a rule which estops a party to play fast-andloose with the courts."
As stated in Martin v. Wood, 71 Ariz. 457, 229 P .
2d 710:
"This doctrine is said to have its foundation
in the obligation under which every man is placed
to speak and act according to the truth of the
case, and in the policy of the law to suppress the
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mischiefs from the destruction of all confidence
in intercourse and dealings of men, if they were
allowed to deny that which by their solemn and
deliberate acts they have declared to be true."
The trial court, whether by forgetfulness or otherwise, should not be allowed to isolate subsequent statements made by defendants or Brimhall inconsistent
with what they previously by solemn admissions had
acknowledged to be the truth. It became apparent that
it was advantageous for them to change their stories.
There was manifested a determination to cheat and
defraund the plaintiff, as fully demonstrated at the
trial by false claims, by attempting to twist solemn
admissions made on cross-examination to mean something else, which this Court should not tolerate, nor
condone. The opinion omits all reference to those situations although mentioned in the appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
The opinion states only part of the undisputed
facts, and bases the affirmance on stories which were
proved to be false and on which the trial court made
no finding. All of the points on issues raised in the
Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant
have been overlooked
for they have not even been mentioned. There was unjust enrichment of the defendants, and that fact is not
mentioned, nor are other undisputed facts and admissions which defendants later attempted to wipe out or
to twist by half-truths.
We believe that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to
a rehearing on all of the issues raised, none of which
was mentioned and apparently omitted from consider47
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ation. An attempt has been made herein to call attention to facts including admissions on which reasonable
minds cannot differ, and which in equity and good
conscience would require reversal of those portions of
the judgment from which appeal was taken.
We respectfully request that there be rehearing
and opportunity for oral argument. We also request
the rereading of the Abstract and the Briefs, as well
as a careful examination of this Brief in Support of
Petition for Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,

Paul E . Reimann
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
AMERICAN AGGREGATE
CORPORATION
Petitioner
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